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I. INTRODUCTION  
Under the law of torts, prospective plaintiffs have numerous 
causes of action for various physical harms that confront people 
daily. As technology advances, people are increasingly 
confronted with a wide range of digital actions that were 
unanticipated by early tort law — digital actions that cause a 
person to suffer real-world physical harm. 
In response, courts have begun tailoring traditional tort 
principles to protect against harmful online activities. For 
example, in 1998 a plaintiff successfully sued Continental 
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Express after a pilot took a photo of the plaintiff and 
superimposed the plaintiff‘s face onto online nude photographs.1 
In 2000, EBay won a trespass to chattel judgment against 
Bidder‘s Edge after Bidder‘s Edge used spiders to data mine 
EBay‘s website.2 Online cyber-harassment claims have also led 
to positive results for plaintiffs by providing relief to plaintiffs 
who suffered real-world harm from a defendant‘s online 
actions.
3
  
Some scholars still argue that limitations exist on the 
application of current tort law to harmful online activities. 
Benjamin Duranske, for example, argues that certain limitations 
currently prevent the application of traditional touch-based torts 
to online conduct.
4
 In analyzing the possibility of online touch-
based torts, Duranske maintains that such torts are barred by 
concepts such as the doctrine of consent
5
 or the ―magic circle‖6 
of play theory.
7
 Duranske‘s argument is elegantly summarized: 
 
No matter how dangerous a sword-swinging Level 70 
Night Elf appears in World of Warcraft, he can‘t really 
hurt the physical player behind the keyboard, and 
everyone knows that. The same is true regarding 
periodic claims of ‗virtual rape.‘ No matter how 
offensive, objectionable, and wrong it may be for 
someone to cause an unwanted sexual animation or text 
                                                 
1 Butler v. Continental Express, Inc., No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 
(Tex. Dist. Ct.-9th June 8, 1998) (awarding plaintiff damages for defamation per se, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and punitive 
damages). 
2 Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder‘s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
3 See, e.g., Sec‘y, United States Dep‘t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Wilson, 
No. 03-98-0692, 2000 WL 988268 (H.U.D. A.L.J. July 19, 2000) (awarding a white 
female and her bi-racial daughter $283,683.64 and $827,793.75 respectively for 
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006), and emotional distress suffered from threats 
posted on a white supremacist webpage). See also Catherine E. Smith, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow Targets the New Head of the Hate 
Hydra, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 33-61 (2002) (offering a detailed discussion of the 
Wilson case and its implications). 
4 BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE OF VIRTUAL WORLDS 179-80 (2008) (proposing that touch-based torts 
cannot exist until technology moves into the realm of player immersion through 
things such as virtual reality). 
5 Consent is defined as ―willingness in fact for conduct to occur.‖ 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1965). This view encompasses the 
principle of volenti non fit injuria, or ―the volunteer suffers no wrong.‖ Thus, 
effective consent constitutes a complete bar to tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 892A (1965).   
6 See generally JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY 
ELEMENT IN CULTURE (1970) (explaining that, under his ―magic circle‖ theory, play 
should be protected from the reach of the real world and, to a degree, the real world 
should be protected from activities defined as play). Under Huizinga‘s theory, tort law 
is not applicable to play activities. 
7 DURANSKE, supra note 4, at 178-80. 
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involving a user‘s avatar to appear on that user‘s 
computer screen, it simply does not meet any state‘s 
legal definition of ―rape‖ . . . .[A]ctual, actionable 
assault and battery that require physical contact are 
simply not possible in virtual worlds and games. At least 
not yet.
8
 
 
Duranske is correct that cyber-battery theory does not apply 
(except in limited circumstances) to online games such as World 
of Warcraft, where touching that might give rise to the tort is 
almost always consensual. Yet even Duranske recognizes that 
free-form social worlds are governed differently than a game 
environment such as Ultima Online or World of Warcraft.
9
 
People who participate in free-form social worlds could apply 
tort law to protect themselves against harms suffered online. 
However, these tort principles need not be limited, and could 
potentially protect people engaging in a wider variety of online 
activity.  
People who engage in online activities are potentially 
affected by a digital harm. Though these individuals may suffer 
relatively minor physical injury, they may suffer incredibly 
intense psychological injury as a result of the harmful conduct. 
Current tort law provides these individuals only minimal 
options, if any, to redress the harm they suffered, and current 
criminal law may provide no options at all.  
For instance, if a person hacks into another‘s personal 
website, Facebook account, or Second Life account, courts may 
find him criminally liable for unauthorized use of a computer or 
hacking, and may suffer a criminal penalty.
10
 The overall goal 
of the prosecution is to protect society as a whole from similar 
actions. However, the individual victims of hacking and similar 
crimes have few options in seeking recovery for the harms they 
suffered, and for the costs they have incurred to make 
themselves whole.  
In the civil realm, there are only minimal remedies for 
computer based crimes and other wrongs. Plaintiffs may seek 
recovery for physical harm to damaged property.  However, this 
action is likely precluded if there was also an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress suit. Similarly, if plaintiffs are 
limited to a simple action for trespass, it is unlikely they recover 
any psychological damages that they suffer.  
                                                 
8 Id. at 180. 
9 Id. at 179-80. 
10 For example, under California law, a person who intentionally hacks into 
another person‘s Facebook account without that person‘s permission is subject to 
monetary fines or imprisonment. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (d)(1-2) (West 2010).    
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As an example, suppose a person questioning his sexual 
orientation uses his website or his digital self to explore and 
come to terms with that aspect of his life. If a hacker takes over 
his account and causes harm, a simple civil trespass action for 
hacking may fail to remedy the full range of psychological 
consequences that the hacker has created. The victim may be 
driven to self-loathing or self-denial, experience deep feelings of 
persecution or rejection, cause harm to himself or others, or take 
his own life. As a real-world example, a girl named Megan 
Meier committed suicide after suffering an incident of cyber-
bullying on Facebook.
11
 Had she not committed suicide, civil 
and criminal law would provide few remedies for justice, and 
almost none would allow Megan to recover for the clear 
psychological damage she suffered.
12
 In Megan‘s case, she 
could possibly sue for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  However, an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
case prevents plaintiffs from recovering for any financial loss to 
their website or Second Life character. 
Some victims may need more than simple recognition that 
an online harm caused emotion distress; they may be better 
helped by legal recognition that what the perpetrator did was a 
battery on them, and caused a direct harm to their physical 
being. Online victims can suffer serious damage as a result of 
digital actions taken against them. Simple recognition by society 
that these people suffered concrete attacks on their identities 
may do more for the healing process than any punishment to the 
perpetrator. Only recognition of the wrongful action as a battery 
can potentially make them whole again.
13
 However, given the 
elements of the tort of battery, only the flexibility of offensive 
contact battery provides plaintiffs with a viable cause of action 
against the individuals who caused them harm online. This is 
because it allows plaintiffs to recover not only for financial 
losses, but also for any psychological damage they may suffer. 
This Article seeks to apply the tort of offensive contact 
battery to the digital age, exploring whether a cause of action for 
cyber-battery would survive under current law. It concludes that 
it is entirely possible for an offensive contact cyber-battery suit 
                                                 
11 P.J. Huffstutter, A Town Fights Back in Myspace Suicide Case, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-
myspace22nov22,0,6270775.story.  
12 See Megan Meier Foundation, http://www.meganmeierfoundation.org 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
13 This is so because the law of assault cannot be reconciled with digital 
harms, because assault requires the victim to actively perceive the harm as it is 
occurring. Because of the nature of data transmission, the victim of a digital harm 
cannot possibly perceive the harm the moment the perpetrator carries it out. Thus, the 
victim is unable to claim he suffered a criminal or civil assault. 
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to succeed under the law of the Second Restatement of Torts.
14
 
Part II of this Article reviews the elements and law of offensive 
contact battery, and discusses the current technological 
landscape, which allows for successful cyber-battery claims. 
Part III discusses specific psychology-based arguments, which 
allow for a digital harm to in some cases rise to the level of a 
valid offensive contact battery claim. Finally, Part IV briefly 
discusses the critical role expert witnesses must play if an 
offensive contact cyber-battery case is to succeed.    
 
II. BATTERY ELEMENTS AND APPLICATION TO CYBER-
BATTERY TORT 
 
Before proceeding to develop and apply the cyber-battery tort, 
one must make two assumptions. First, one must assume that 
jurisdiction is properly established. Second, one must assume 
that the anonymity issue often inherent in online activity is not 
present, or that evidence is available to prove the defendant‘s 
identity.
15
 Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
states that: 
 
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) 
he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with the person of the other or a third person, or an 
imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) an 
offensive contact with the person of the other directly or 
indirectly results.
16
 
 
 
 
Offensive contact battery requires that the defendant act, 
without consent, intending to cause an offensive contact with 
the plaintiff, directly or indirectly.
17
 This tort is broken into 
seven specific areas of discussion: (a) the act, (b) intent, (c) 
offensive touching, (d) causation, (e) lack of consent, (f) lack of 
privilege, and (g) damages. A plaintiff must prove all of these 
elements in order for a plaintiff to succeed in a cyber-battery 
case. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See discussion infra Part II.A-G, III.A-B. 
15 In some scenarios, the victim will know the identity of the defendant, but 
given the anonymous nature of the Internet, there may be situations in which a suit 
must proceed against a John Doe defendant until the defendant‘s identity can be 
determined during discovery. In scenarios (such as password theft) that result in the 
harm, for the sake of discussion we should assume that the identity of the defendant is 
known.  
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965). 
17 Id. 
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A. Act 
 
The meaning of the word ―act‖ is governed by Section 2 of 
the Second Restatement of Torts. The term ―act‖ refers to ―an 
external manifestation of the actor‘s will, and does not include 
any of its results,‖ no matter how direct, immediate, or intended 
the results are.
18
 For example, if the actor points a pistol at 
another and pulls the trigger, the ―act‖ is the pulling of the 
trigger, not the contact of the bullet hitting the person.
19
 
In the context of cyber-battery, the ―act‖ is the defendant‘s 
action, which created the digital harm. Examples of digital acts 
include typing on a keyboard, clicking with a mouse, or 
designing and launching a computer virus. Because ―act‖ refers 
to an external manifestation of the actor‘s will, rather than the 
results, all that a plaintiff must prove is this simple external 
action.
20
 A defendant‘s ―act‖ is relatively easy to prove in cyber-
battery cases. The greater challenge in satisfying this element is 
identifying the defendant and linking him to the action that 
caused harm.  
 
B. Intent 
 
To prove intent, the plaintiff generally must show that the 
defendant performed an act with the intent to inflict an offensive 
touching on the plaintiff or a third person.
21
 The word ―intent‖ 
denotes that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his 
act, or that he believes the consequences are substantially 
certain to result from it.
22
 In essence, the defendant simply 
needs to desire the harmful or offensive touching, or believe that 
the offensive touching was substantially certain to result from 
his act.
23
  
The Section 8A intent test is a subjective test based on what 
was in the defendant‘s mind when he acted.24 A jury would not 
                                                 
18 Id. § 2. 
19 Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
20 Id. 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18(1)(a) (1965). 
22 Id. § 8A. 
23 See, e.g., Garrett v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955) 
(explaining that ―unless he [the actor] realizes that to a substantial certainty, the 
contact or apprehension will result, the actor has not that intention which is necessary 
to make him liable…‖). See also Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864, 867 (S.D. 1992) 
(―To establish intentional conduct, more than the knowledge and appreciation of risk 
is necessary; the known danger must cease to become only a foreseeable risk which 
an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid (ordinary negligence), and 
become a substantial certainty.‖ (emphasis in original) (quoting VerBouwens v. 
Hamm Wood Products, 334 N.W.2d 874 (S.D. 1983))). 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
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ask what a reasonable person would have desired or believed, 
but rather what this particular defendant in fact desired or 
believed.
25
  
 
All consequences which the actor desires to bring about 
are intended . . . . Intent is not, however, limited to 
consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that 
consequences are certain or substantially certain, to 
result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by 
the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the 
result.
26
  
 
The defendant‘s motive is immaterial; tort law is only 
concerned with whether the defendant had the requisite intent 
based on desire or belief, or under the substantial certainty 
test.
27
  
The Second Restatement of torts also contains a caveat -   
because the interest protected by offensive contact battery is a 
dignitary interest, the contact must be an intentional invasion.
28
 
There is no liability for an act involving a risk, no matter how 
great or unreasonable, if the risk is only causing an offensive 
contact.
29
 The interest in freedom from bodily contact that 
causes no tangible harm, but is merely offensive to a reasonable 
sense of personal dignity, is ―protected only against acts which 
are intended to invade it or to invade some other interest of 
personality of the person who is touched.‖30 This is contrary to 
the interest in freedom from bodily harm, which is protected 
against intentional invasions, negligence, and unintentional, 
reckless invasions. Thus, Section 18 of the Second Restatement 
requires that the defendant act with the purpose of bringing 
about an offensive contact, or with knowledge that such a result 
is substantially certain to occur.
31
  
Considering the nature of harms that would give rise to a 
cyber-battery claim, the intent element is likely easy for a 
plaintiff to establish, particularly with the assistance of a 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. § 8A cmt. b.  See also Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (1891) 
(―The rule of damages in actions for tort was held… to be that the wrongdoer is liable 
for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could 
not have been foreseen by him.‖). 
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 20 (1965) (stating that if an act 
―causes an offensive bodily contact to the other, the actor is subject to liability to the 
other although the act was not done with the intention of bringing about the resulting 
offensive contact‖). 
28 Id. § 18 cmt. g.  
29 Id. 
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Intro. Notes (1965).  
31  Id. § 18, cmt. e.   
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computer expert. Acts of creating or sending a computer virus, 
hacking into a webpage, stealing a password, or destroying a 
piece of digital property all require a deliberate and intentional 
act. A defendant who performs any of those acts, among others, 
knows with substantial certainty what consequences will result. 
If a plaintiff can lay out, in exact detail, the steps taken by the 
defendant, this is normally sufficient to show a jury that the 
defendant intended the consequences of his actions.  
 
C. Offensive Touching 
 
To make a case for battery, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant‘s intentional act resulted in an offensive touching of 
the plaintiff‘s person, or something so closely associated with 
the plaintiff as to make the touching tantamount to a physical 
invasion of the plaintiff‘s person.32 The definition of offensive 
contact under Section 18 of the Second Restatement is governed 
by Section 19.
33
 A touching is offensive if it offends a 
reasonable person‘s sense of personal dignity.34 A comment to 
Section 19 states that for a touching to offend ―a reasonable 
sense of personal dignity,‖ the contact must ―offend the ordinary 
person‖ rather than a person ―unduly sensitive as to his personal 
dignity.‖35 Therefore, offensive contact is ―contact which is 
unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place 
at which it is inflicted.‖36 However, a caveat to Section 19 states 
that ―[t]he Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the actor 
is liable if he inflicts upon another a contact which he knows [is] 
offensive to another‘s known but abnormally acute sense of 
personal dignity.‖37  
Section 18‘s broad scope, though, is the reason why a cyber-
tort for battery is actionable. Comment (c) of Section 18 states 
that: 
 
In order to make the actor liable under the rule stated in 
this Section, it is not necessary that he should bring any 
part of his own body in contact with another's person. It 
                                                 
32 Id. § 18. 
33 See id. § 19. 
34 See Id. § 19. 
35 Id. § 19, cmt a. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. § 19, caveat; See Richmond v. Fiske, 160 Mass. 34, 35 N.E. 103 
(1893) (allowing recovery where the defendant touched the plaintiff to wake him up 
and presented a milk bill after being told not to do so); See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 27 (1965) (explaining that the actor is liable for assault if the 
act intends to put another in apprehension of immediate bodily contact even where a 
person of reasonable courage would not have been in such apprehension). 
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is enough that he intentionally cause his clothing or 
anything held or attached to him to come into such 
contact.…Since the essence of the plaintiff's grievance 
consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the 
unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability 
of his person and not in any physical harm done to his 
body, it is not necessary that the plaintiff's actual body 
be disturbed. Unpermitted and intentional contacts with 
anything so connected with the body as to be 
customarily regarded as part of the other's person and 
therefore as partaking of its inviolability is actionable as 
an offensive contact with his person….If the actor 
recognizes any object, however slightly or remotely 
attached to the other's person, as being so far a part of 
the other's personality that he can accomplish his 
purpose of offending the other by some contact with it, it 
is not unreasonable to regard the object in the same light 
and, therefore, to make the actor liable under the rule 
stated in this Section. This may well be so although the 
connection with the plaintiff's body is so slight that if the 
actor had dealt with the object as a thing and not as a 
means through which he could reach and offend the 
other's dignity, the other as a reasonable man should not 
regard the integrity of his person as violated.
38
 
 
This is the critical language on offensive contact battery. 
Specifically, Comment (c) sets forth the principles that govern 
offensive contact battery of all forms. This section sets the 
parameters for the tort and allows for the tort‘s application to 
digital harms. 
Under Comment (c), a plaintiff‘s physical body does not 
need to be touched. The comment makes it clear that ―it is not 
necessary that the plaintiff's actual body be disturbed.‖39 The 
tort can proceed so long as the thing touched, ―however slightly 
or remotely attached to the other‘s person,‖ is ―so connected 
with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the 
other‘s person.‖40 This principle was applied in early offensive 
battery cases. In a case from 1784, Respublica v. De 
Longchamps,
41
 the defendant struck the plaintiff‘s cane and was 
held liable for assault and battery. The U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the defendant‘s actions were ―of that kind, in which the 
insult is more to be considered, than the actual damage; for, 
                                                 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18, cmt. c. (1965). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 1 U.S. 111 (1784). 
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though no great bodily pain is suffered by a blow on the palm of 
the hand, or the skirt of the coat, yet these are clearly within the 
legal definition of the Assault and Battery….‖42 This 
recognition that ―the insult is more to be considered, than the 
actual damage‖43 is an acknowledgment that the offending 
behavior does not actually have to physically harm the plaintiff 
in order for the plaintiff to recover. Additionally, the Court 
noted that ―anything attached to the person, partakes of its 
inviolability.‖44 These principles have expanded to cover other 
cases where no actual contact occurred, including instances of 
one spitting in another‘s face,45 knocking a flashlight out of 
another‘s hand,46 seizing a package being carried,47 taking a 
plate from a person,
48
 and snatching away a book.
49
 Indeed, the 
court in Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel stated clearly that 
―actual physical contact is not necessary to constitute a battery, 
so long as there is contact with clothing or an object closely 
identified with the body.‖50 
Comment (c) and case law also make it clear that a 
defendant can cause a battery by acting through an object that in 
turn acts upon the plaintiff, rather than acting directly on the 
plaintiff. This means that while in cases like Fisher
51
 and Alcorn 
v. Mitchell,
52
 where the defendant actually acted on the 
plaintiff‘s body (grabbing a plate held in his hand and spitting in 
his face, respectively), direct, physical action is not necessary. 
For example, in Garrett v. Dailey,
53
 the defendant was accused 
of committing a battery by pulling out a chair from underneath 
the plaintiff. There, the defendant‘s action was not directly on 
the woman, but rather on the chair. The battery (the woman 
                                                 
42 Id. at 114. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See generally Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872) (finding the 
defendant guilty of trespass where a person spat in the face of the defendant at the 
adjournment of trial). 
46 See generally New Mexico v. Ortega, 113 N.M. 437, 827 P.2d 152 
(1992) (finding defendant guilty of battery where defendant knocked a flashlight from 
a police officer‘s hand). 
47 See generally Morgan v. Loyacomo, 1 So.2d 510 (Miss. 1941) (finding 
defendant guilty of assault and battery when defendant followed suspected shoplifter 
out of store and forcibly seized the package). 
48 See generally Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 
(Tex. 1967) (finding employee guilty of battery for snatching a plate from the hands 
of a guest at a buffet luncheon). 
49 See generally S.H. Kress & Co. v. Brashier, 50 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1932) (finding manager guilty of assault when violently jerked a pattern book 
from the hands of a customer). 
50 Fisher, 424 S.W. at 629 (citations omitted).  
51 424 S.W.2d 627 (1967).  
52 63 Ill. 553 (1872). 
53 Garrett v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955). 
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falling to the ground) occurred as a result of the defendant‘s 
action of pulling the chair away. In the context of a cyber-tort, 
this allowance of indirect actions is critical, because a defendant 
committing cyber-battery can never act directly on the physical 
body of the plaintiff. The defendant must always utilize some 
instrument (usually a computer) in order initiate the touching.  
Additionally, the language of Comment (c) does not state 
that the object acted upon must be physically attached, rather 
than emotionally or mentally attached to the person.  Nor does 
the comment say that ―person‖ only refers to a physical body.54 
Section 18 states only that the object acted upon must be part of 
the victim‘s personality, and that it is ―so connected with the 
body‖ to be considered part of the person.55 Comment (c) notes 
that the defendant‘s interpretation matters, and suggests that if 
the defendant believes he can offend the plaintiff by contacting 
the object, then the object is considered a part of the plaintiff 
and the defendant is liable.
56
 Given the connection with identity 
and personality that some digital objects share, it is not a stretch 
to conclude that intangible digital objects can meet the standard 
of being ―part of the person‖ under Comment (c). 
Common law battery protections have extended to anything 
practically identified with the body, and a plaintiff‘s interest 
―includes all those things which are in contact or connected with 
it.‖57 ―[T]ouching anything connected with [the plaintiff‘s 
person], when done in a rude or insolent manner, is sufficient.‖58 
For example, in Clark v. Downing,
59
 the plaintiff successfully 
sued the defendant for assault, after the defendant struck the 
plaintiff‘s horse. The important thing about Clark is that the 
plaintiff was not actually riding the horse or even around the 
horse when it was struck.
60
 Instead, the plaintiff was inside a 
wagon that the horse eventually pulled.
61
 Yet, the court found a 
sufficient connection between the plaintiff and the horse to hold 
the defendant liable.  
In the context of cyber-battery, the plaintiff is not attached to 
the website, the massively-multiplayer online role-playing game 
(―MMORPG‖), or the avatar, but is instead connected to those 
things through the medium of the computer. Indeed, the plaintiff 
is not even connected to the actual computer all the time. Yet, 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 39 (5th ed. 
1984). 
58 See Morgan v. Loyacomo, 1 So.2d 510, 511 (Miss. 1941). 
59 55 Vt. 259 (1882). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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the plaintiff can argue that he has such an emotional and 
psychological connection with an object (website, avatar, 
computer, or message board) that for all purposes it is connected 
with him so much as to be a part of him, much like how Clark 
was connected to his horse.  
Finally, Comment (c) notes that the standard for judging 
whether a thing is considered a part of the plaintiff‘s person is a 
―customarily regarded‖ standard, meaning that the standard is 
open to modification by changing societal views.
62
 Comment (a) 
of Section 19 also touches on this standard, stating that the 
requisite contact is ―contact which is unwarranted by the social 
usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.‖63 
In order to meet this standard of proof, the plaintiff will likely 
have to introduce evidence of an object being connected with 
his person, likely through expert testimony. Thus, a psychologist 
(while already necessary to prove damages) becomes critical to 
establishing the offensive contact element and surviving a 
motion for summary judgment. This expert testimony is 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV. 
In addition to Comment (c), Comment (d) of Section 18 also 
impacts the application of offensive contact battery to online 
activity. Comment (d) states that ―it is not necessary that the 
other should know of the offensive conduct which is inflicted 
upon him at the time when it is inflicted.‖64 This comment 
makes it clear that the affront can be felt as keenly by the victim 
after the event as it can be when the event is being perpetrated, 
and that the wrong is no less wrong just because the victim may 
not perceive it at the exact moment it occurs.
65
 Thus, an 
offensive wall posting, a hacking of a webpage or a deleted or 
assaulted avatar can all fall under a battery claim, even if the 
victim was not present at the moment the action took place. 
Comment (d) is absolutely critical to the survival of a cyber-
battery claim, as most online harms occur when the victim is not 
present, or when the victim (by virtue of the nature of 
cyberspace) is unable to observe the battery.  
If a plaintiff can establish through expert testimony that the 
target of the online touching was connected enough to the 
plaintiff‘s physical person, Comments (c) and (d) seem to allow 
this target to be considered as part of the plaintiff‘s person. If 
that target is a part of the plaintiff‘s person, the comments 
suggest that the defendant‘s conduct would constitute a touching 
for purposes of Section 18. 
                                                 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18, cmt. c. 
63 Id. § 19, cmt. a. 
64 Id. § 18, cmt. d. 
65 Id. 
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D. Causation 
 
The Second Restatement of Torts requires that the harmful 
or offensive touching is caused by the defendant‘s act or some 
force set into motion by the act. This causation element is 
satisfied if the defendant‘s conduct ―directly or indirectly‖ 
results in the injury.
66
 Assuming anonymity is not an issue, 
establishing that the defendant‘s act caused the offensive 
touching is not difficult. All a cyber-battery plaintiff must do is 
present evidence that the defendant committed the act, and that 
the act caused the resulting harm. The Restatement of Torts and 
case law make no requirement that the act take place in the real 
world, as opposed to a digital environment, in order to show 
causation. In addition, as long as the defendant acted 
intentionally, the law will hold the defendant liable for the direct 
and indirect consequences of his acts, regardless of whether they 
were foreseeable.
67
 This automatic liability prevents the 
defendant from arguing about any unanticipated consequences 
of his digital actions. 
 
E. Lack of Consent 
 
Under Section 892 of the Restatement of Torts, consent is 
defined as ―willingness in fact for conduct to occur.‖68 The 
Restatement codifies the common law principle of volenti non 
fit injuria, translated as: ―to one who is willing, no wrong is 
done.‖69 The Restatement allows consent to manifest either by 
action
70
 or inaction, and notes that consent does not need to be 
communicated to the actor.
71
 Additionally, if words or conduct 
are reasonably understood by the actor to intend consent, then 
they constitute apparent consent.
72
 However, in order to meet 
the requisite consent, ―the consent must be to the particular 
conduct of the actor, or to substantially the same conduct.‖73 
Consent (if it covers the particular conduct or substantially the 
same conduct perpetrated by the actor, or if the act is within the 
                                                 
66 Id. § 13, § 18. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. § 892. 
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A, cmt. a (1965).   
70 This concept is called consent in fact and includes scenarios in which the 
victim tells the defendant that the conduct in question was permissible. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. b (1965). 
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. § 892A, cmt. c. 
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scope of any conditional consent) constitutes a complete bar to 
tort liability.
74
 Thus, establishing a lack of consent is important 
to any plaintiff attempting to bring forth a claim of cyber-
battery. 
While it seems that there are few instances where a victim 
would consent to conduct that would constitute cyber-battery 
against digital property, the issue of consent is likely more 
problematic in the context of online games or virtual worlds. 
Duranske‘s argument against the viability of touch-based torts 
was based primarily on the idea of consent and the ―magic 
circle‖75 concept of protected play.76 That argument basically 
incorporates the volenti non fit injuria – ―the volunteer suffers 
no wrong‖ – principle. The whole idea behind the ―magic 
circle‖ is that ―play should be protected from the reach of the 
real world‖ and that ―the magic circle protects this play space 
from the intrusions of the law.‖77 Because play is protected, 
legal remedies are not actionable when appropriate play results 
in injury.
78
 
However, when considering the ―magic circle‖ concept and 
the applicability of a cyber-tort to online games, it is better to 
think of virtual gaming activities not in the context of wholly 
protected spheres of play, but rather in the context of other types 
of games.
79
 In the context of athletic injuries, a plaintiff 
consents to injury from blows administered in accordance with 
the rules of the game, but not from deliberate blows which are 
illegal.
80
 Applied to the online game and online world context, 
conduct is not actionable unless it falls outside the rules of the 
game or violates a terms of service agreement.
81
  
                                                 
74 Id. § 892A(1). 
75 See generally HUIZINGA, supra note 6. 
76 DURANSKE, supra note 4, at 178-80. 
77 Id. at 178. 
78 Id. at 178-80. 
79 Duranske recognizes this principle, noting that ―the key is that the 
consent only goes as far as the rules of the game permit.‖ Id. at 178. 
80 See, e.g., Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986) (―This is 
particularly true in professional sporting contests, which by their nature involve an 
elevated degree of danger. If a participant makes an informed estimate of the risks 
involved in the activity and willingly undertakes them, then there can be no liability if 
he is injured as a result of those risks.‖). 
81 For example, in the MMORPG World of Warcraft, it may be totally 
acceptable for one character to kill another if both have activated the appropriate 
function. However, the same act could be an actionable violation if the attacking 
player has hacked the game in order to allow him to kill non-consenting characters. 
Or, in the context of the internet-based virtual world Second Life, if a person sold a 
product that had a hidden script that would cause the purchaser‘s character to be 
harmed without consent then the seller could be held liable, though this might fall 
under cyber-products liability more than cyber-battery. See generally DURANSKE, 
supra note 4, at 178-80.    
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Additionally, with regards to the concept of Huizinga and 
Duranske‘s magic circle, an interesting situation might develop 
if a virtual world such as Second Life were to adopt a legal 
system as part of its in-game rules or terms of service.  For 
example, if Second Life adopted parts of the Second 
Restatement of Torts, under the magic circle concept, ―play‖ 
(the nature and rules of the game itself) is altered and has to 
adapt. Thus, the very notion of play would change to envision 
situations in which players are possibly charged and face 
potential real-world consequences for violations of the game 
rules. Indeed, this is perhaps exactly what the games creators 
desire: to have the real world influence and shape the way the 
game is played.   
 
F. Lack of Privilege 
 
Privilege is used ―to denote the fact that conduct which, 
under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to 
liability, under particular circumstances does not subject him to 
such liability.‖82 Privilege ―signifies that the defendant has acted 
to further an interest of such social importance that it is entitled 
to protection, even at the expense of damage to the 
plaintiff….[A] privilege exists when it is established that the 
defendant acts from a justifiable motive.‖83 It should be noted 
that social context can define privilege.
84
 For example, in 
Vosburg v. Putney, the defendant was held liable for battery for 
kicking the shin of the plaintiff in a school classroom after 
classes had begun.
85
 The court stated that in the classroom, ―no 
implied license to do the act complained of existed, and such act 
was a violation of the order and decorum of the school….‖86 
The court contrasted the classroom setting with the setting of the 
school playground at recess; here, the same kick would likely 
not have violated the rules of that type of environment, 
particularly if the parties were engaged in sports or rough play.
87
   
In a cyber-battery case, a defense of privilege will almost 
never apply. Types of actions that would constitute cyber-
battery are generally not the kinds of activities that promote 
important social interests. In fact, the typical cyber-battery 
action would likely run contrary to a wide range of legitimate 
and important social functions involving the Internet. Thus, only 
                                                 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (1965). 
83
 PROSSER ET AL., supra note 57, § 16, at 109.  
84 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT 22 (2d ed. 2003). 
85 See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 403-04 (1891).  
86 Id. at 404. 
87 Id. at 403-04. 
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in rare cases a privilege defense is applicable to defeat a cyber-
battery claim. 
 
G. Damages 
 
A battery is complete upon commission of the harmful or 
offensive touching. The general principle on damages is that the 
wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the 
wrongful act, regardless of whether the injuries are 
foreseeable.
88
 ―[N]o harm or actual damage of any kind is 
required. A plaintiff is entitled to demand that a defendant 
refrain from offensive touching, although the contact results in 
no visible injury.‖89 Simply put, even if no actual harm is 
suffered, the court will award at least nominal damages. In 
addition to nominal damages, the plaintiff may recover damages 
to compensate him for the harm suffered, including amounts for 
general,
90
 specific,
91
 and punitive
92
 damages.  
The amount of damages a cyber-battery plaintiff can collect 
will change on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of 
the harm, the consequences of the harm, the testimony of 
experts, and the jury. Because a cyber-battery plaintiff is 
automatically entitled to nominal damages, this pattern of 
variation will not bar a cyber-battery suit, even if the jury 
believes the plaintiff suffered no financial harm. It is important 
to note that for some cyber-battery plaintiffs, the amount of 
damages awarded, if any, may be insignificant in comparison to 
the personal value they derive from a jury simply validating 
their personal rights in the thing harmed by the defendant. 
Indeed, this jury acknowledgement of wrongdoing alone may be 
reason enough for some plaintiffs to pursue cyber-battery 
actions. 
                                                 
88 Id. at 404. 
89 KEETON  ET. AL, supra note 57, § 9, at 41.  See also South Brilliant Coal 
Co. v. Williams, 292 So. 589, 591 (Wisc. 1921) (―If … Gibbs kicked plaintiff with his 
foot, it cannot be said as a matter of law, that there was no physical injury to him. In a 
legal sense, it was a physical injury, though it may have caused no physical suffering, 
and though the sensation resulting there from may have lasted but for a moment.‖). 
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1965) (defining general 
damages as compensatory damages for such a common harm resulting from the 
tortuous act that the damages are anticipated and do not need to ―be alleged in order 
to be proved‖). 
91 Id. (defining special damages as ―compensatory damages for a harm other 
than one for which general damages are given‖); Id. at cmt. b (―In personal injury 
cases, harm to earning capacity, expenses for medical treatment and similar items are 
ordinarily treated as bases for special damages.‖). 
92 Id. § 908 (defining punitive damages as damages different from 
compensatory or nominal, awarded to punish tortfeasor for his egregious conduct or 
awarded because the trier of fact believes the tortfeasor had a malicious intent or had 
a grave indifference ―to the rights of others‖). 
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III. PSYCHOLOGY – ESTABLISHING “OFFENSIVE CONTACT” 
THROUGH EXPERT TESTIMONY  
For a cyber-battery tort to succeed, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant‘s conduct constituted a touching of the 
plaintiff and that the object harmed is customarily regarded as 
part of the victim‘s person.93 The plaintiff will need the 
assistance of an expert psychologist (preferably one who 
focuses on identity, personality, and cyber-psychology) in order 
to elicit detailed testimony with enough accuracy and credibility 
to satisfy a court. 
A cyber-battery plaintiff will have to use an expert because 
the tort involves a touching that may seem, at first glance, 
disconnected from the physical person claiming harm. The 
expert can show the fact-finder the fundamental link between 
self and cyber-self, which is necessary to establish a touching. 
By explaining this link, the expert will also show how the object 
―touched‖ is customarily regarded as part of the victim‘s person. 
 
A. Cyber-Touching Can Meet the Required ‘Touching’ Standard 
Under the Restatement 
 
The ultimate issue in a cyber-battery tort is easily stated: 
how can a court consider a defendant‘s act of harming an avatar, 
website, Facebook page, LiveJournal profile, or the like as a 
touching of the plaintiff? First, ―harming‖ refers to the 
defendant‘s act of wrongfully touching the digital thing, or 
deliberately causing damage to the digital thing. Not only does 
the action matter, but also the intent and the consequences. 
Relief is only provided to plaintiffs for harms that result from 
deliberate wrongs. If there is no digital wrong, then there is no 
digital harm. Thus, it would not constitute battery for two 
players in a video game to consensually duel each other to the 
death. However, it is a cyber-battery to hack into a person‘s 
account and delete her characters, modify her website, or 
otherwise destroy or damage her property.  
The Restatement of Torts requires the object touched to 
consist of ―anything so connected with the body‖ or ―so far a 
part of the other‘s personality‖ as to be regarded as part of the 
plaintiff‘s person.94 However, it is not ―necessary that the 
plaintiff‘s actual body [is] disturbed.‖95 This standard allows for 
                                                 
93 Id. § 18, cmt. c.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
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the possibility of an intangible object, such as a website or an 
avatar, qualifying as part of the plaintiff‘s person, provided that 
the object is highly connected to the plaintiff‘s body or 
personality. Indeed, the comments recognize that offensive 
contact can occur even if ―the connection with the plaintiff's 
body is so slight that if the actor had dealt with the object as a 
thing and not as a means through which he could reach and 
offend the other's dignity, the other as a reasonable man should 
not regard the integrity of his person as violated.‖96 
With the growth of technology and its increasingly 
widespread availability, people today have the ability to interact 
in a variety of digital worlds and create a variety of online 
identities. People immerse themselves in their digital 
environments, their web pages, and their journals. They invest 
their emotions and time into these creations, and form 
attachments to them as real (in their minds) as their real-world 
connections. As a result, these digital objects become more than 
mere possessions; they become extensions of personality and 
self, with psychological consequences when they are harmed.  
The idea that digital objects, and harm to those objects, 
affect their users‘ personality has been noted by many general 
observers. A clear example is the idea of virtual rape in digital 
worlds. In 1994, Julian Dibbell published A Rape in 
Cyberspace, which recounted an online incident in a text-based 
social game, where a character created an item which, when 
activated, described the graphic rape of other characters in 
explicit detail on the players‘ screens.97 In the article, Dibbell 
described the outrage that arose over the conduct, and observed 
the real-world pain and anger that many of the victims 
expressed as a result of a purely digital action.
98
 Regina Lynn 
from Wired Magazine has also noted the psychological impact 
of virtual rape:  
 
There is no question that forced online sexual activity – 
whether through text, animation, malicious scripts, or 
other means – is real; and is a traumatic experience that 
can have a profound and unpleasant aftermath, shaking 
your faith in yourself, in the community, in the platform, 
even in sex itself…Virtual rape is not just a prank, one 
the target needs to get over or expect as part of a role-
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace: Or, How an Evil Clown, a Haitian 
Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a 
Society, in FLAME WARS: THE DISCOURSE OF CYBERSPACE 237, 239-41 (Mark Dery, 
ed., 1994). 
98 Id. at 242-45. 
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playing world….A virtual rape is by definition sudden, 
explicit, and often devastating. If you‘ve never 
immersed yourself in online life, you might not realize 
the emotional availability it takes to be a regular member 
of an internet community. The psychological aspects of 
relating are magnified because the physical aspects are 
(mostly) removed.
99
 
 
The connection between digital objects and personality has 
also been noted by psychologists, and has led to the growth of 
the field of cyber-psychology. In their studies, cyber-
psychologists have seen the same connections and extensions of 
personality formed with digital objects as they have seen with 
real life objects. Sherry Turkle has noted: 
 
The computer of course, is not unique as an extension of 
self. At each point in our lives, we seek to project 
ourselves into the world. The youngest child will eagerly 
pick up crayons and modeling clay. We paint, we work, 
we keep journals, we start companies, we build things 
that express the diversity of our personal and intellectual 
sensibilities. Yet the computer offers us new 
opportunities as a medium that embodies our ideas and 
expresses our diversity.
100
 
 
In the context of online games or chat rooms, where people 
have the chance to create or express various identities, Turkle 
has found ―that for some this play has become as real as what 
we conventionally think of as their lives, although for them this 
is no longer a valid distinction.‖101  
According to Turkle, forming extensions to and projecting 
personality onto digital objects is now quite common.
102
 ―The 
Internet has become a significant social laboratory for 
experimenting with the constructions and reconstructions of self 
that characterize postmodern life. In its virtual reality we self-
fashion and self-create.‖103 But this self-fashioning and self-
creation is not limited to just one identity or role. Turkle notes 
that ―in postmodern times, multiple identities are no longer so 
much at the margins of things. Many more people experience 
                                                 
99 Regina Lynn, Virtual Rape Is Traumatic, but Is It a Crime?, WIRED, May 
4, 2007, 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/sexdrive/2007/05/sexdrive_0504. 
100 SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE 
INTERNET 31 (1995). 
101 Id. at 14. 
102 See id. at 31. 
103 Id. at 180. 
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identity as a set of roles that [are] mixed and matched, whose 
diverse demands need to be negotiated.‖104 This school of 
thought recognizes how online objects are linked to personal 
identity, and how many people experience identity in this 
manner. 
The concept of multiple identity expression is not a new one, 
nor is it limited to the context of the Internet.  
 
The idea that individuals possess multiple senses of self 
and identity has long been discussed in psychology and 
sociology. William James noted, ―A man has as many 
social selves as there are individuals who recognize 
him.‖ One important historical version of the multiple 
self notion is the distinction between the public and 
private self (e.g., Baumeister). Both Goffman and Jung 
focused on this distinction. Goffman used the metaphor 
of the theatre to describe the multiplicity of self and 
identity. He argued that people wear different masks for 
their various social interactions, playing at the role(s) 
best suited for a particular situation and audience, and 
only going maskless when in private. For Jung, one‘s 
conscious ego (the self that is presented to others) is less 
authentic than is the unconscious ego – in other words, 
according to Jung, one‘s real individuality resides in 
one‘s private self. More recently, further distinctions 
have been made in the idea of multiple selves. The 
tendency for people to have potential senses of self that 
they have not yet realized and, indeed, may never 
realize, has been examined. Markus and Nurius first 
broached this concept of possible selves. Possible selves 
are those selves that we possibly might become in the 
future. They include versions of self that we would like 
to become as well as those we hope to avoid becoming 
(i.e., the ‗dreaded self‘). Along similar lines is the 
conception of the ―ideal self,‖ which contains those 
attributes of self-hood that we would ideally like to 
possess and which we strive to become. Although 
possible and ideal selves are not selves currently 
possessed by the individual, they do not exist only in the  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 Id. 
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abstract. Rather, they serve as important guides to actual 
behavior in the present (Higgins).
105
 
 
Indeed, ―extending one‘s sense of self in the form of abstract 
representation‖ has been described as ―one of our most 
fundamental expressions of humanity.‖106  
In the realm of online games such as Multi-User Domains or 
Multi-User Dungeons (―MUD‖) and MUDs of the Object-
Oriented variety (―MOO‖), personal identity has been 
dramatically affected by the connections players have with their 
characters and their virtual worlds. Digital environments 
―encourage both time and emotional investment from the users, 
and . . . users derive salient emotional experiences from these 
environments.‖107 Users also create avatars108 and then use those 
avatars to explore and interact with their environments. ―Avatars 
have become a popular way of projecting one‘s personality on 
the Internet.‖ 109 While sometimes they are used as a disguise to 
hide a person‘s identity, other times they reveal more about a 
person than known in a face-to-face meeting.
110
 Avatars ―have 
the effect of increasing a person‘s sense of presence in . . . 
cyberspace‖ and this ―sense of embodiment in cyberspace‖ 
plays an important role in how people relate to others in the 
                                                 
105 Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, Through the Internet looking glass: Expressing 
and validating the true self, in THE OXFORD  HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY 
205, 206-07 (Adam N. Joinson et al. eds., 2007) (citations omitted). See also 
WILLIAM JAMES, PSYCHOLOGY: THE BRIEFER COURSE 179 (1892); E. Tory Higgins, 
Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 319 (1987) 
(describing how we have different versions of ourselves, the ideal self, the ought self 
and actual self, and how discrepancies between these selves lead to issues); Hazel 
Markus & Paula Nurius, Possible Selves, 41 AM. PSYCHOL. 954 (1986); Roy F. 
Baumeister, Preface, in PUBLIC SELF AND PRIVATE SELF v-vii (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 
1986) (describing the evolution of public and private self). See generally ERVING 
GOFFMAN, THE PRESERVATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (discussing a novel 
perspective, the theater, on analyzing how we interact with others); C.G. JUNG, Two 
ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY (R.F.C. Hull trans., Bollingen Foundation 2d 
ed. 1966) (1953) (discussing his theories on consciousness, unconsciousness, and how 
the two interact).  
106 Jeremy N. Bailenson & Andrew C. Beall, Transformed Social 
Interaction: Exploring the Digital Plasticity of Avatars, in AVATARS AT WORK AND 
PLAY: COLLABORATION AND INTERACTION IN SHARED VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS, 1,2  
(Ralph Schroeder & Ann-Sofie Axelsson, eds. 2006). 
107 Nick Yee, The Psychology of Massively Multi-User Online Role Playing 
Games: Motivations, Emotional Investment, Relationships and Problematic Usage, in 
AVATARS AT WORK AND PLAY: COLLABORATION AND INTERACTION IN SHARED 
VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 187, 194 (Ralph Schroeder & Ann-Sofie Axelsson eds. 
2006). 
108 See KENT L. NORMAN, CYBERPSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 284 (2008) (describing an avatar as the incarnation 
of one‘s personality in the digital world). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 285-86.   
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online world.
111
 Scholars have found that subjects with avatars 
experience higher levels of immersion, involvement, and 
awareness in digital environments.
112
 
Digital activities can become so immersive that ―[s]ome 
participants begin to confuse what happens in their simulated 
life with their real one.‖113 This is not a new phenomenon. 
When a person plays a character in a fantasy game he begins to 
identify with that character and experience the emotions and 
feelings of that character.
114
 In researching MUDs, Turkle found 
that ―[f]or many game participants, playing one‘s character(s) 
and living in the MUD(s) becomes an important part of daily 
life.‖115 Because many game participants choose to ―play 
aspects of themselves, MUDs can also seem like real life.‖116 
However, MUDs also become an area for identity construction, 
a context ―for discovering who one is and wishes to be.‖117 In 
the realm of personal sexual exploration, Regina Lynn notes that 
digital ―adult communities facilitate our need to go deeper into 
our sexual selves, even into secret places around gender and 
taboos that we cannot acknowledge anywhere else. We feel safe 
because of the peculiar blend of disclosure and anonymity 
provided in online communities, and we journey along paths we 
might not even glance at in the physical world.‖118 As Dibbell 
noted, many players experience a recognition that ―what 
happens inside a MUD made world is neither exactly real nor 
exactly make-believe, but profoundly, compellingly, and 
emotionally meaningful.‖119 
In studying MUD players, Turkle found that some players 
construct lives more expansive than their real lives,
120
 and that 
others form a relationship among various personae which are all 
an aspect of the player.
121
 ―In sum, MUDs blur the boundaries 
between self and game, self and role, self and simulation . . . . 
[People] play who they are or who they want to be or who they 
don‘t want to be‖ and players use their real selves as a 
                                                 
111 Id. at 286. 
112 See, e.g., Michael Gerhard, David Moore, & Dave Hobbs, Embodiment 
and Copresence in Collaborative Interfaces, 61 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-
COMPUTER STUDIES 453 (2004). 
113 JANE M. HEALY, FAILURE TO CONNECT: HOW COMPUTERS AFFECT OUR 
CHILDREN‘S MINDS – FOR BETTER AND WORSE 196 (1998). 
114 See, e.g., GARY A. FINE, SHARED FANTASY: ROLE-PLAYING GAMES AS 
SOCIAL WORLDS 205 (1983) (describing the social and cultural systems in role-
playing games). 
115 Turkle, supra note 100, at 183. 
116 Id. at 184. 
117 Id. 
118 Lynn, supra note 99.  
119 Dibbell, supra note 97, at 244. 
120 Turkle, supra note 100, at 193. 
121 Id. at 190. 
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composite of their characters or use their characters ―as means 
for working on their RL lives.‖122 
In the context of online games, it is particularly important to 
note the distinction between acceptable actions in online play 
and unacceptable actions of digital harm. The tort of cyber-
battery requires an intentional wrong. This requirement 
indicates a distinction between actions inherent in online games 
which are within the scope of risk accepted by a player, and 
actions outside the scope of risk.  
In computer games like World of Warcraft, the rules are 
typically simple. The game builds in parameters for things it can 
control (such as players fighting players), and provides warnings 
for things it cannot control (such as foul language on game 
servers).
123
 What constitutes a digital harm in the gaming 
context is determined by consulting the game rules (i.e., do the 
rules make it permissible for one user to hack into the account 
of another and delete his character?) or by reviewing how the 
allegedly harmful action occurred. For instance, it is not cyber-
battery if one player made a comment during game play that 
insulted a particular racial group. However, it is cyber-battery if 
the perpetrator knew the victim was a member of that racial 
group, and began sending a continuous stream of racially 
offensive comments to the victim‘s character or personal email 
account. 
With environments such as personal websites, Facebook, 
and online journals, the best way to determine what is or is not 
socially acceptable is through consulting the terms of service. 
Terms of Service agreements often lay out the type of conduct 
that is acceptable and the conduct that is unacceptable. Civil and 
criminal law can also be consulted. It is likely that if certain 
conduct is disallowed by law, that conduct is not permissible on 
the site. While consent and scope of risk may play a part in the 
analysis, determining whether the action was wrongful and 
intentional is generally not difficult.  
In free-form social worlds, determining whether conduct is 
wrongful is more complicated. These worlds typically exist as 
alternatives to the real world. Therefore, in addition to checking 
the Terms of Service of the overall program, users seeking to 
bring a cyber-battery action should also consult specific rules or 
agreements for each particular world. Sometimes, users may 
agree to make certain actions permissible that is otherwise 
impermissible. At other times, users may create harsher rules to 
                                                 
122 Id. at 192. 
123 World of Warcraft Terms of Use, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).  
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govern their behavior. These variables can all be taken into 
account when determining whether the victim placed herself 
within the scope of risk for the type of harm she claims to have 
suffered. These variables are also considered in determining 
whether the allegedly harmful conduct was an intentional 
wrong. 
The connection between identity and self on the Internet is 
not just limited to the realm of online games. The realm of 
online personality creation is also important. Online 
personalities are created in a number of ways. Turkle has 
commented that ―[o]n the Web, the idiom for constructing a 
‗home‘ identity is to assemble a ‗home page‘ of virtual objects 
that correspond to one‘s interests.‖124 Online personality 
creation causes the user to form a connection with these virtual 
objects.
125
 ―[T]hose who become most immersed in Internet 
culture develop a sense of synesthesia which allows them to 
exercise all of the senses through their eyes and fingers.‖126 This 
synesthesia allows users to ―experience the movement ‗into‘ 
cyberspace as an unshackling from real-life constraints – 
transcendence rather than prosthesis‖ – and through virtual 
identity-play, they can remain themselves in some lasting 
way.
127
 However, sometimes ―a person‘s on-line persona 
becomes so finely developed that it begins to take over their life 
off the net.‖128 In this manner and others, online personas can 
profoundly affect offline personas.  
Katelyn McKenna described an online potential for self-
discovery in terms of a person‘s search for his true self.129 ―The 
true self is said to be comprised of identity-important aspects of 
                                                 
124 Id. at 258; see also Yair Amichai-Hamburger, Personality and the 
Internet, in THE SOCIAL NET: HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE 27, 41-42 (Amichai-
Hamburger ed., 2005) (describing personal websites as a ―construction of identity‖ 
and as capable of manipulation and experimentation by a person contemplating which 
part of his or her identity to display). 
125 See Richard C. Sherman, The Mind’s Eye in Cyberspace: Online 
Perceptions of Self and Others, in TOWARDS CYBERPSYCHOLOGY: MIND, COGNITION 
AND SOCIETY IN THE INTERNET AGE, 66 (Guiseppe Riva & Calo Gamilberti eds., 2001) 
(noting that home pages are illustrations of self-presentation that make it possible to 
express a sense of self on an unparalleled scale) but c.f. Sandra Y.M. Chan, 
Wired_Selves: From Artifact to Performance, 3 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR, 
271, 273 (April 2000) (noting that home pages are like physical space as a place 
where people project personalities, hopes, dreams, and fears creating symbolic 
presentations). 
126 Shawn P. Wilbur, An Archaeology of Cyberspace: Virtuality, 
Community, Identity, in THE CYBERCULTURES READER 45, 48 (David Bell & Barbara 
M. Kennedy eds., 2000). 
127 Id. 
128 Allucquère Rosanne Stone, Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?: 
Boundary Stories About Virtual Cultures, in THE CYBERCULTURES READER, supra 
note 126, at 506 (emphasis added).  
129 McKenna, supra note 105, at 207. 
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self that an individual currently possesses, yet is generally 
unable to readily express to others in most situations, despite 
very much wishing to do so.‖130 McKenna argues that there are 
numerous reasons why the true self is either not expressed to 
others, or not accorded proper validation if expressed. These 
reasons include role expectancies and constraints within society, 
conditional acceptance by peers and family, social anxiety, 
loneliness, and the need for containment of personal 
information.
131
 Yet McKenna found that ―the Internet is a 
potentially powerful means by which people can express their 
true selves and meet important social and psychological needs 
that are not being met in real life.‖132 
McKenna‘s analysis is similar to Turkle‘s concept of the 
Internet as a ―social laboratory‖ for experimenting with self and 
identity.
133
 McKenna argues that ―expressing and gaining 
validation and acceptance for these aspects of self‖ that 
sometimes are only expressed through the Internet, ―often has 
important implications for one‘s sense of self, as well as for 
one‘s close relationships.134  
Heidi Figueroa-Sarriera
135
 describes the relationship 
between online personae and real people ―as a sort of 
heteronymous-autonomous self.‖136 ―In virtual spaces,‖ she 
writes, ―One has parallel identities which . . . can become 
parallel selves and lives‖ 137  by allowing ―the possibilities for 
self-discovery, even self-transformation.‖138 Each virtual self 
has its own construction and also has a construction with the 
real self. Both the virtual selves and the real self continuously 
explain their identity formation projects with the other.
139
 ―In 
short, as disembodied subjects, we represent ourselves in 
various ways in virtual space, but at the same time, this virtual 
experience continues to interrogate the territorialized 
(embodied) subject, keeping up a sort of extended conversation 
through self-reflection that is now unfolding or transmuting 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 208-10.  
132 Id. 
133 Turkle, supra note 100, at 180. 
134 McKenna, supra note 105, at 205. 
135 Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera, Connecting the Selves: Computer-Mediated 
Identification Processes, in CRITICAL CYBER-CULTURE STUDIES 97 (David Silver & 
Adrienne Massanari eds. 2006). 
136 Id. at 103. 
137 DON TAPSCOTT, GROWING UP DIGITAL: THE RISE OF THE NET 
GENERATION 96-97 (1998). 
138 Turkle, supra note 100, at 260. 
139 Figueroa-Sarriera, supra note 135, at 103. 
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from the open space to the territory.‖140 The end result is that 
these ―self-reflection processes‖ create ―a subject and a body 
that cannot be reduced to an entity,‖ where the distinctions 
between the virtual personae and the embodied personae do not 
matter.
141
 
Yair Amichai-Hamburger, who conducted a study of online 
chatting users, describes the self-discovery component of the 
Internet as a search for the ―real me.‖142 The Internet is 
important for online chatters because ―[t]he unique protection 
afforded by the Internet encourages people to use it as a haven 
in which to explore their identity.‖143 Amichai-Hamburger notes 
that ―for a significant number of people such as introverts, 
neurotics, lonely people, and people with social anxiety, the 
Internet may become a very significant part of their lives and 
perhaps the only one in which they truly express themselves.‖144  
Individuals can form strong connections with online 
activities, and they can use those activities to formulate new 
forms of identity. Therefore, it is possible for a psychologist to 
testify that harm to an online activity constitutes a touching. In 
the nineteenth-century Vermont case, Clark v. Downing,
145
 the 
court found an offensive battery when the defendant struck the 
plaintiff‘s horse as the plaintiff sat in his wagon. The modern 
equivalent is striking a plaintiff‘s car, either while the plaintiff is 
inside the car, or in, say, an RV or boat attached to the car. If 
such an act would constitute an offensive battery, a strong case 
is made that destroying or damaging a tool, which helps 
constitute part of a person‘s entire identity, is certainly an 
offensive battery. While one can invest a good deal of himself in 
a horse or a car, in the online context, one uses potentially 
vulnerable tools to develop and refine his very personality and 
concept of self.  
Suppose, for example, that B kicks A‘s car. A may suffer 
aggravation, anger, or fear. However, if B destroys A‘s online 
identity or an aspect of that identity, A could suffer aggravation, 
anger, fear, a loss of identity, and emotional trauma, as well as 
other psychological harms that could take considerable time to 
fix. As another example, suppose A uses her online avatar and 
personal website to explore her masculine side. If B damages 
those things through sending A sexually explicit attacks or 
                                                 
140 Id. (citing Heidi J. Figueroa Sarriera, In and Out of the Digital Closet: 
The Self as Communication Network, in CYBERPSYCHOLOGY 141-42 (Angel J. Gordo-
López & Ian Parker eds. 1999) (emphasis in original)). 
141 Figueroa-Sarriera, supra note 135, at 103. 
142 Amichai-Hambuger, supra note 124, at 27. 
143 Id. at 38. 
144 Id. at 37. 
145 Clark v. Downing, 55 Vt. 259 (1882). 
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insults, A might end up pushing away from or repressing those 
aspects of her personality, thus causing long-term psychological 
damage.  
Given the extensive development of cyber-psychology as a 
field, experts are likely capable of introducing evidence to a 
court of the profound connection between self and digital self. 
With the development and increasing availability of cyber-
psychological research, expert opinions regarding a plaintiff‘s 
psychological connection to a digital object should generally 
meet the evidentiary standards for admissibility in court.
146
 
Expert opinions of this sort should certainly provide enough 
evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment, and are 
likely admissible as evidence to prove a touching under the law 
of offensive contact battery.     
 
B. The Object of a Cyber-Touching can be Customarily 
Regarded as Part of the Plaintiff’s Person 
 
Under Section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
contact at issue must be with anything so connected with the 
body as to be customarily regarded as part of the other's 
person.
147
 Therefore, it must ―be a contact which is unwarranted 
by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is 
inflicted.‖148 This approach focuses on community standards, 
and requires a psychological expert to testify that online 
activities can become so important to a person that they are 
customarily regarded as part of their person.
149
 The Section 18 
standard is met by presenting evidence of the impact that online 
activity can have on a person,
150
 and also presenting evidence of 
the scientifically recognized multiple identity view.
151
 A judge 
then decides whether the ―customarily regarded‖ standard is 
met.
152
 Therefore, an expert must present compelling testimony, 
given that many judges are older and possibly less familiar with 
(and open to) the idea of multiple computer identities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 See discussion infra Part IV.  
147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18, cmt. c. (1965). 
148 Id. § 19, cmt. a. 
149 Id. § 18, cmt. c. 
150 See supra Part III.A.  
151 See McKenna, supra note 105, at 205-06.  
152 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
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IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY 
In order to win a cyber-battery case, a plaintiff must 
introduce evidence from two types of experts: a computer expert 
and a psychologist. The computer expert has two critical 
functions. First, he or she can offer testimony as to the 
defendant‘s specific act that created the battery. Second, and, 
more importantly, he or she is the one who establishes an 
indentifying link between the defendant and the defendant‘s 
online activity. The testimony of the plaintiff‘s psychologist is 
also critical. The psychologist is needed to establish a sufficient 
connection between the plaintiff and the item touched so that the 
defendant‘s action is classified as a harmful or offensive 
touching under the offensive contact battery requirements.
153
 
Additionally, the psychologist‘s testimony may enable the 
plaintiff to recover emotional distress damages, depending upon 
the nature and extent of the harm caused by the defendant.
154
 
Before admitting this expert testimony into evidence, the 
plaintiff‘s experts must satisfy qualification requirements and 
prove to the court that their testimony and opinions are 
reliable.
155
 Given the lenient nature of the qualification 
requirements,
156
 a plaintiff should have little trouble finding a 
qualified computer expert who can testify. Also, there is likely 
little difficulty in establishing the reliability of the computer 
expert‘s testimony pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 702. Finding a 
satisfactory psychologist, on the other hand, is likely more 
difficult, and might require a plaintiff to hire a psychologist who 
deals specifically in cyber-psychology. Additionally, problems 
may arise regarding the reliability of the psychologist‘s 
testimony. As a threshold matter, under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the expert testimony must ―assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.‖157 In 
addition, testimonial reliability must be satisfactorily shown, in 
accordance with the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrill 
                                                 
153 See supra Part III.A-B.  
154 Henry Fradella et al., The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of 
Behavior Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 423 (2003) (―Given that the law 
recognizes a compensable tort for both the intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotion distress, it is not surprising that courts routinely accepts the testimony of 
psychologists and psychiatrists regarding the types of emotional distress someone 
may have suffered.‖).  
155 These standards must be in accordance with FED. R. EVID. 702 & 703, or 
the appropriate state rules of evidence, in addition to the standards set forth by the 
applicable evidentiary case law.  
156 An expert can be qualified by ―knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education.‖ See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
157 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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Dow
158
 and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,
159
 or the reliability 
standards of the appropriate state regarding expert testimony. A 
plaintiff‘s failure to provide such testimonial reliability likely 
leads to the expert‘s exclusion by the court and the case‘s 
dismissal through summary judgment or directed verdict. 
Given the essential nature of expert testimony in cyber-
battery actions, experts must be permitted to testify in order for 
such actions to have any chance of success. A cyber-battery 
plaintiff‘s failure to obtain admissible testimony from qualified 
experts will likely spell the end of his claim. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
The development of new digital applications, games, and 
web content provides us with an ever-expanding array of ways 
to interact and exist in the digital world. As we continue to 
immerse ourselves in digital activities, and as we raise our 
children in a world where having an online presence is the 
norm, the likelihood of us becoming victims of harmful online 
activities increases. Additionally, as the Internet becomes more 
prevalent in our lives, its psychological effects will also 
continue to expand.
160
  
If we are confronted with certain harmful online actions, we 
may suffer personal and psychological harm similar to the harm 
resulting from traditional torts committed in the real world. 
These harmful online actions should become increasingly 
commonplace as the Internet becomes a more dominant part of 
our daily lives.
161
 Therefore, people need a means to protect 
themselves from being harmed over the Internet.  
In order to recognize cyber-battery as an actionable tort, 
legal recognition that digital harms have real world 
consequences is required. What occurs online does not 
necessarily stay online. Harm is caused regardless of whether 
                                                 
158  509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (modifying the Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 three-part requirement for testimony by allowing judicial discretion as to the 
reliability of expert testimony based on a four-part test).  
159 Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (expanding the 
Daubert requirements to all expert knowledge and also modifying the applicability of 
Daubert). 
160 For example, one scholar, David Levy, has written extensively about 
how people might be affected in the area of love and sex by continual digital 
interactions with computers and robots. Levy also writes on how current bonding 
between people and their electronic possessions is being affected by attachment 
theory and psychological changes as a result of our interactions with technology. See 
DAVID LEVY, LOVE AND SEX WITH ROBOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN-ROBOT 
RELATIONSHIPS (2007). 
161 This likelihood is particularly true if the Internet becomes a broad and 
widely accessible community forum, or if it becomes a primary means of personality 
development and expression. 
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one wrongfully knocks a plate out of a man‘s hand or 
wrongfully knocks an e-book out of an avatar‘s hand. Given the 
rapidly expanding nature of online activity and virtual worlds, 
we need to recognize that an intentional and wrongful harm is 
still an intentional and wrongful harm, no matter where it takes 
place. A person should not escape the consequences of his 
wrongful actions, particularly if his victim suffers severe 
psychological damage, simply by using the Internet as a 
defense.  
Civil tort law already recognizes that some actions constitute 
battery even if the victim‘s physical body is not directly 
affected.
162
 The lack of a cyber-battery statute is possibly due to 
the nature of lawmakers. Individuals charged with making and 
modifying laws are typically much older than most of the people 
who will likely suffer digital harms at issue in a cyber-battery.
163
 
Lawmakers may not understand or recognize the harms that can 
result to victims of cyber-battery. Perhaps this is because they 
do not understand how a person is so involved in a digital world 
that he suffers consequences from harms that occur in that 
world. Most current lawmakers are not exposed to the Internet 
as much as the typical cyber-battery victim. These lawmakers 
are unlikely to have played the games, used the tools, or 
engaged in the activities referenced in a typical cyber-battery 
victim‘s complaint.  
To change the law and promote an acceptance for cyber-
battery actions, victims and victims‘ advocates must lobby 
lawmakers, as well as those close to lawmakers. Victims and 
their advocates should work with people in government who are 
connected to the digital activities at issue. They should explain 
where the harms lie and what can do done to address the harms. 
State bar associations should play a major role in speaking out 
for victims of cyber-battery and framing the issues created by 
the cyber-battery tort. They can also provide the legal expertise, 
financial backing, and statewide influence necessary to create 
changes in the law. 
                                                 
162 See supra Part II.A-G. 
163 In 2008, the average age of a member of the United States House of 
Representatives was 55.9, and the average United States Senator was 61.7 years-old. 
See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CRS REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS: MEMBERSHIP OF THE 110TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf. Individuals among the 
ages of 55 and older are less likely to use the Internet for activities that often give rise 
to cyber-battery such as social networks, virtual words, and online games. See 
Memorandum from Sydney Jones, Research Assistant & Susannah Fox, Associate 
Director, PEW Internet & American Life Project (Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Generations_2009.pdf.   
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Current tort law already has remedies for harms created 
through cyber-battery. The key now is to show that the harms 
suffered by victims of cyber-battery are real, and that these 
harms can be addressed through tort remedies. Current 
psychological research on personality development, as well as 
research in the rapidly growing field of cyber-psychology, can 
show a court that cyber-harms can meet the ‗touching‘ standard 
under the Restatement of Torts.
164
 This research can show that 
digital objects touched can be customarily regarded as part of 
the plaintiff‘s person.165 Similarly, it is possible that the results 
of this research can show lawmakers and judges that cyber-
battery and its consequences are both real. By offering expert 
testimony, a plaintiff can establish the offensive touching 
element, and make out a prima facie case of cyber-battery.
166
 
These same expert witnesses can speak out at bar functions and 
conferences, as well as write articles to teach others about the 
harms of cyber-battery.  
With the continued development of computer technology 
and increases in online activity, there is greater recognition for 
harms caused by wrongful online actions. As online wrongs 
continue to gain exposure, more and more people will see the 
need for a proper civil remedy. An offensive contact cyber-
battery tort is a useful tool to protect online users from those 
who use the Internet for wrongful purposes. This tort can help 
give victims of online harm the financial recovery and 
emotional healing they desperately need. It will also send a 
message to perpetrators that the harms they create in the digital 
world are just as wrong as harms created in the real world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 See supra Part III.A-B.  
165 See supra Part III.B.  
166 See supra Part IV.  
